1. Introduction

In 2004, we said in an analysis that referred to the question of South-East Europe, in which new visions and development orientations were developed by the political centers that “since the declaration of independence, Bucharest was a faithful defender of Chisinau interests”[1]. The analysis conceptualized the strategies and the tactical field in which some of the actors, geopolitical ideologies and tendencies at the Romanian border manifested themselves and found that “the implications of Romania, which after much of political and diplomatic prudence, finally announces its active participation”[2].

Over the past decade, Romania, supported by its powerful transatlantic partner, has sought to play an important role, including advancing in the CIS region. The United States and Romania wanted to participate together in the process of developing democracy in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Romania has been invited to attend the GUUAM / GUAM Summits, whose aim is to establish relations between the former Soviet republics oriented towards the European and Euro-Atlantic vector, to which Russia did not participate, which shows that the Romanian state in the region[3]. Former Romanian President Traian Basescu said that “the enlargement process of NATO and the EU has brought the Euro-Atlantic community to the west coast of the Black Sea. Recent developments in Ukraine, Georgia and even the Republic of Moldova have created preconditions. In this context, Romania’s strategic partnership with the United States is crucial for regional security and the promotion of democracy in the region, and the EU’s “good neighbor” policy is able to contribute this objective. Atlantic security is closely linked to the security of the Black Sea and the Black Sea region is dominated by economic stagnation, unsafe and unsafe borders, organized crime activities and frozen conflicts. We cannot let the region become a victim of European history, a gray area at the gates of Eastern Europe, it is need for a massive participation in this region of the United States, the EU, NATO and the OSCE. Romania’s interest in its eastern neighborhood is as justifiable as the interest of France, Italy and Spain, as a member of the EU, in their Mediterranean neighborhood”[4].

Former Romanian President Traian Basescu, along with former Georgian leader Mikhail Saakashvili and Ukrainian President Victor Iuşcenco have launched a “new Yalta conference to reaffirm the freedom and security of the peoples of the Black Sea basin. The phenomenon has reopened the chapter of a troika wishing to assemble the mechanism of freedom and democracy in this part of the post-Soviet space subject to communism and terror, but also to transmit the lesson and the experience of democracy to other peoples the ghost of tyranny, despotism and suffering[5]. Later, a new regional body was created on the “Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian” axis, launched in Artek, Ukraine by the heads of the Georgia, Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic States[6]. The great absence was Romania, which was not been invited. From the point of view of exploiting the Euro-Atlantic phenomenon in the creation of the Mediterranean Sea – Black Sea – Caspian Sea larger space, the role of Romania was an essential solution and an optimal solution, using the Bucharest-Washington-London geostrategic axis of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

In all geopolitical models of the size of the Black Sea, Romania can be considered as a “pivotal state” between East and West. The Romanian state has the role of security provider for the whole region. It is the geostrategic backbone that can potentiate all the “nerve centers” in coagulation, the state relations involved in this constitutive process, and geographic projections for the most remote countries in the region. Romania also plays an important role in the Ponto-Baltic geopolitical system by developing the Caspian Sea-Black Sea-Mediterranean relationship as a link between the extremities and, at the same time, as a possible relation with the western industrial zone offered on the Danube. Romania is also part of other geopolitical systems – Carpathians (localization: Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania – area involved in Russia, Republic of Moldova); the Black Sea (the Romanian state can be considered, in the given context, as the south-east trade gate, comparable to that of the Netherlands, considered as the north-west gate of Europe); Danubian (across the Rhine-Main-Danube axis, as well as the link between the Black Sea and Western Europe, the role of Romania as a geographical location seems to be extremely privileged); Caspian (Romania can acquire the characteristics of the relational center across the Black Sea, linking the Ponto-Baltic, Mediterranean or Central-European factor to the Caspian basin). This is the case of the geopolitical analysis that we tried to apply briefly, because the importance of Romania in the development of an international organization at regional level, as desired – Baltic-Sea Community Black-Caspian – is more than necessary. It is vital. So why did not the states that act as advocates of the post-Soviet “young democracies” take into account the involvement and experience of Romania?” – I was wondering[7].

Is there a Romanian factor that can encourage the geopolitical confluences of the Black Sea? Without a doubt there is. Because in 2006 there was a Romanian initiative in the Euxin basin (Black Sea) called the Black Sea Forum. An initiative that has sought to encompass the democratic options of states that are in the Black Sea region and that can include it in a system of welfare, security, pacification and demilitarization. This reasoning is confronted with that of the Russian Federation which includes the states of the Black Sea in conflicts and ethnic, ideological-political interests.

Another theme related to the phenomenon of the border is that of the Diasporas. Because Romania cannot remain a “fortress” in the processes of globalization: on the one hand, it has massively encouraged the departure of Romanians in the world, but it has deliberately discouraged entry into the country. The Diaspora has remained a soft instrument of the state with which it can operate and open “doors” and “doors” in the world.

With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, the Black Sea has become the “direct neighbor” of the Union. Starting from the pre-accession commitment with NATO and the EU, Romania has gradually become the most active member of the two organizations that have promoted the strategic importance of the Black Sea for regional stability and the European continent as well as the strategic links of the region, which are made to couple Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

At the stage of EU accession, Romania advocated increased EU participation in the Black Sea region. Strong support, achieved through cooperation with other Member States, mainly Greece, Bulgaria and Germany, which chaired the EU, has contributed to the success of this approach to Black Sea Synergy (COM 2007) and the processes initiated. The importance of the region then began to take shape in a number of EU policies and instruments for the Eastern Neighborhood, including the Eastern Partnership (2009), the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (2010).

2. Romania and regional / sub-regional cooperation

Regional cooperation is an important element of Romanian diplomacy as it helps to strengthen the political dialogue and the development of regional projects. A number of political, economic, security and cultural issues can be better resolved quickly and resolved through joint and focused efforts. To this end, the regions provide the appropriate framework for establishing cooperation mechanisms that contribute to regional and international security and to the improvement of people’s lives.

In addition, regional cooperation has been complementary to the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Romania is an active participant in regional cooperation initiatives, processes and structures with complex and extremely diverse issues in both South-Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia:

The South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP)

The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC)

The Central European Initiative (CEI)

The Danube Cooperation Process (PCD)

The SECI Regional Center for Combating Transnational Crime

Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC)[8].

Romanian state in the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO)

Geostrategic, Romania has achieved its most important goals and has gained over time a privileged position within the Alliance, a strategic position.

The favorable and advantageous position of Romania within NATO is mainly related to the development of the strategic partnership of our country with the United States, in particular by accepting the installation of elements of the shield-shield of NATO to Deveselu. The priorities of the Alliance and the contribution of 2% of the country’s defense budget, through the participation of military troops in the Alliance’s external missions.

The nature of the world order / international system

Until the 2016 elections when Barack Obama was the President of the United States, the Atlantic Alliance states rallied to the American position, considering that the status of world leader in a unipolar world gave them the right to hide under US military infrastructure; not to participate properly in the Alliance budget and to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In the context where the United States has accepted that the world has become its multipolar complex (non-classical multipolar claimed by Russia, one of the nineteenth century – the beginning of the twentieth century), then the new US President, Donald Trump, demanded that each NATO state, if it respects the alliance, to contribute to the alliance’s system of values ​​and resources, increase its defense budget.

The United States no longer invokes the status of world leader in a unipolar world, but that of superpower in a multipolar world. The interest of Romania is therefore rooted in the axiological system of the North Atlantic Alliance and through it to increase its strategic capabilities.

3. Hierarchy in the decision-making process by the Romanian geostrategy

Contemporary geopolitics is represented by the strategies of political decision makers applied to geographical and visual spaces (noologies – cyberspace, meta-spaces).

1. The (geo) strategic area is to create and deliver projects and strategies that project the capabilities of a country in and around the world. The composition of national strategies is based on a “strategic matrix” of the state that balances its capacities and vulnerabilities, its mode of expression and its ability to influence power on the international stage, from a regional point of view but also political.
2. The operational areal representing the industry of strategic laboratories initiates analyzes and carries out the operations of the state, implements the conduct of the state, and which favors the national interests and the reason of the state. The operational area is the one that focuses on the actors and tools that will implement the projects and strategies of the country.
3. The tactical area is subordinate to the first decision areas and consists of a multitude of actors who aim at realizing the country’s strategies and are part of the logic of the specific state operations. The actors involved in the tactical field are those targeted by the operational zone to promote the national interests of the state and resolve conflict situations. The actors are many and varied: political parties, intelligence, state, non-governmental, transnational organizations, businesses, media institutions, religious denominations, public institutions and organizations to simple citizens.

Prior to 2007, Romania had a strong link in its national strategy with the Western matrix with integration with NATO and the European Union. At the same time, our country has been planning its long-standing strategies to increase the national role in the international zone, ensuring the social aspects of the state and the nation.

4. The “strategic matrix” of a country

What does it look like and what is a “strategic matrix”? First, based on the strategic matrix, its status assessment is done and its strength is predicted, the decrypted ones are alliances that are made through the template of the strategic matrix.

The strategic matrix has nine basic factors:

1. Administration / governance;
2. Territory;
3. Natural Resources
4. Population
5. Economy
6. Culture and religion
7. Science and education;
8. Army (military forces);
9. Foreign policy (geopolitical environment).

 

The strategic matrix is ​​the one that provides the border force and state capabilities, which assesses the central core, boundaries and springs (resources) of a particular country. It can have a strong or weak composition: Romania of 1922 has potentiated a strategic matrix distinct from that of 1939-1940 or 1947-1952.

5. Approach to strategic cooperation

 The geostrategic vision of Romania stems from the American geostrategy “Friends and partners in a turbulent world” – on the NATO line (including hard power, soft power and smart power).

 A coherent approach according to which Romania must act on the concept of self-empowerment of the Eastern Partnership, derived from the soft power policy, which is also reflected in the strategic formulas of the Three Seas Initiative.

 Project the EU’s Global Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) in the South-East Europe region, in particular the Black Sea and Central Asia.

6. The priority geopolitical axes of Romania

– Ponto-Caspian axis (Romania-Azerbaijan-Georgia, Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova, Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey;

– Ponto-Baltic axis (Poland – Romania – Turkey, Romania – Ukraine – Republic of Moldova, Romania – Ukraine – Poland;

– Ponto-Mediterranean-Baltic axis (Intermarium or the Three Seas Initiative, Romania-Bulgaria-Serbia, Romania-Italy-Serbia;)

– Euro-Atlantic axis (Bucharest-London-Washington, Bucharest-Brussels-Washington)

– European axis (Romania-France -Germany)

– Central European axis (Romania-Germany-Poland)

– Central-South Europe axis (Romania-Serbia-Hungary, Romania-Bulgaria-Greece).

7. The Black Sea and the Euro-Atlantic factor

Mental maps and the acute need for “meteorological” politicians concerned with building the strategic planning of the state of tomorrow remain a societal priority. Geopolitics is considered a mental map, and a state draws such a map in which estimates of its position and role, the relationship of forces with its neighbors, the regional context in which the international environment operates and its fundamental coordinates.

States action on the international scene – through the sense of opportunity that they show; through the intelligence with which she exploits a context; by their willingness to react to certain tendencies, etc. – must be deduced from the veracity of their mental maps[1].

The Black Sea has a long history of conflict and divergent interests, becoming in recent years an area where its area is influenced by three major international players: NATO, the European Union and Russia. Until the collapse of the Soviet bloc, all the states of the Black Sea, with the exception of Turkey, were in Moscow’s sphere of influence. They were either members of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. Today, the Soviet Union no longer exists and the bipolar world order has become a thing of the past. By joining Romania and Bulgaria in the EU, “Western European democracy” has extended its borders to the Black Sea basin, at the crossroads of three European, Euro-Asian and Islamic security zones. Its new strategic configuration has become evident since the early 1990s, when the first energy transmission projects from East to West[2].

The 2016 report of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) on the Black Sea region indicates that in the competition for influences emerging in the Middle East and the Black Sea, it turns out that Russia has built a logistic platform offers him the opportunity to design his operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The Black Sea has become an important area for the West and reveals an area of ​​vulnerability for the Eastern flank of the Alliance:

„Given the increased international competition for influence in the Middle East, the Black Sea has also been transformed in the main logistical platform supporting Russia’s naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aden Gulf area. Moscow currently maintains 10 ships in the Eastern Mediterranean, several of them transported from its Black Sea Fleet.

The Black Sea is also an important arena for the West and forms a zone of vulnerability for the eastern flank of the Alliance. The region contains significant ethnic and religious diversity, a factor of potential discord that enables Russia to inject itself in neighbours’ airs and exert pressure on several governments to return within Moscow’s orbit. NATO cannot allow any of its littoral member states (Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey) to be seriously threatened by an ambitious adversary or it could lose its credibility as a security organization. The West also has a keen economic interest in diversifying energy sources and upholding routes from the Caspian Basin, in which the Black Sea forms a hub and network for energy deliveries and pipelines to Europe outside of Russia’s control[3]. Russia’s expanding presence in Crimea creates the prospect of a rapidly remilitarizing Black Sea.

Aviation patrol routes and enlarged air and naval defense networks heighten Russia’s ability to threaten and interdict foreign fleets—as illustrated by recent Russian harassment of NATO vessels. Moscow has deployed numerous missile-bearing ships and planes to the Black Sea region, which together with Iskander missiles in Crimea place all of the Black Sea littoral within range of Russian conventional and WMD (weapons of mass destruction)-capable missile attacks”[4].

On the other hand, we must emphasize that in 2015, the Center for International and European Studies (CIES) in Istanbul and the Trust for Black Sea Regional Co-operation in Bucharest designed two trilateral projects to operate in the Black Sea and become key players in the optimization and consolidation of the European and Euro-Atlantic project, especially for the Eastern Partnership countries. Romania has been given a key role. In the report and the scenarios of the respective institutes, an important role is given to the Trilateral Poland-Turkey-Romania (EU and NATO states) which will contribute to an enlarged cooperation with the countries of the Second Trilateral – Georgia – Ukraine – Moldova, represent countries with an interest in the Eastern Partnership of the European Neighborhood Policy and the North Atlantic Alliance.

This approach is the responsibility of the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, who declared in Washington on June 7, 2017, the debate “20 years later – The relevance of the Romanian strategic partnership in the current international and security context” organized by Heritage Foundation: „Romania is acting within NATO, but also together with its strategic partners Poland and Turkey, to keep the region safer. That is why Romania has developed, together with these two countries, a Trilateral format on security issues. Romania is also, together with Poland, the initiator of the Bucharest Format, including all the 9 Allies on the Eastern Flank. This format is relevant for the U.S. interests in NATO, and for the security of the Eastern neighbourhood. NATO must also continue to support its partners, such as Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. This is essential for ensuring security and stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood”^[5].

8. Romania’s approach to the Intermarium vision or the Three Seas Summit

The formation of isobaric geopolitical fronts or pressures could discourage Russian and neo-imperial ambitions, it would balance an exclusive power of Germany in tandem with France in a “multipolar” Europe that often favors its own interests to the detriment of other European states, eventually provide a common front to revive European unity and discourage the Russian factor.

The Three Seas Initiative comes from an earlier strategic vision of Polish geopolitics Józef Piłsudski, which was adopted at the beginning of the third millennium by the famous American strategist George Friedman. For many political analysts, Intermarium represents an American fence  close between Russia and the European Union.

Heads of state from all over central Europe were convened in Warsaw, Poland, to discuss how to move regional infrastructure projects forward. They were next to US President Donald J. Trump. The Three Seas Summit, convened by the Presidents of Poland and Croatia, concerns countries between the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic and the Black Sea. The participants were decided by asking a vision of a Europe that is whole, free, and in peace etc.

Ian Brzezinski and David Koranyi said in the study “The Three Seas Summit: A step towards achieving the vision of a whole Europe, free and at peace?”

„Success at the Three Seas Summit will be defined by the unity expressed by its participants and their ability to prioritize and operationalize cross-regional projects in close cooperation with European institutions. That will be key to ensuring sustained, long-term support from not just the EU and the United States, but also the international business community. Openness, pragmatism, an enabling investment climate, regulatory convergence, public-private partnerships, financial assistance from European funds, and sustained government support will be the keys to success”.

Trump’s presence at the “Three Seas Initiative” summit in Poland (2017), a country in a sensitive region, has caused tensions with Germany. The presence of President Trump was considered an offense against Germany and the European decision-maker prepared to do double standards (in the relationship with the Russian Federation) and mercantile compared to the United States and most European peripheral states. Germany is warned against the new US sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation in late July 2017, the law against opponents by sanctions (24/07/2017)[1], particularly on the energy sphere (Russian oil and gas), the actor who promotes Russian interests in Europe.

9. Romania against Russia

In Russian intelligence analysis and reports, for example, the Russian Federation Institute for Strategic Research (RISI, former Institute of Foreign Intelligence Services, currently under Russian Federation presidency), Romanian policy , which is active in the “southeastern perimeter of the anti-Russian front”, and at the same time tries to replace the direction of Warsaw and apply it in this region.

“In its political statement, Romania has overtaken Poland at full speed: from the mouths of heads of state, statements have been made that credibility fascist leaders and have made some plans to annex a foreign territory (…) In this report, the experts of the Institute for Strategic Research tried to look at the phenomenon from different angles and to highlight the risks and threats to Russia that are present in the contemporary policy politics of the Romanian authorities”[2].

It is interesting that the Institute for Strategic Research of the Russian Federation (RISI) is not the only strategic research institute focused on the research of the Romanian and Black Sea phenomenon, the south-eastern European space, especially since it was focused on the Balkan destination by the year 2014. Or the Institute inaugurated at the end of the first decade of the 21st century in Tiraspol and held international conferences that took into account the foreign policy of Romania and the geostrategy of the Romanian State. In addition to the multitude of specialized institutes for Europe and the southern flank of the EU and NATO, RISI, in collaboration with the CIS Institute, organized its field of investigation on the dimension of the impact of Romania in its natural proximity.

The London-Washington-Bucharest axis has disrupted Russian diplomacy. In the 2007 Annual Report on Russian Diplomacy, it is noted that Moscow has taken important steps to undermine Romania’s policy in the Black Sea[3].

Conclusions

In this study, we intend to decode and analyze Romania’s participation in regional constructions and the geopolitics of its proximity.

Undoubtedly, Romania has several forms of manifestation and the establishment of relations and alliances at the regional level, resulting from the composition of the construction of the global system and integration within it. We have tried to answer the question: what are the current strategies in Romania’s regional constructions, how does the country’s “strategic matrix” behave in the present and whether the Romanian state can be this supplier of security? the EU and NATO.

In 2004, when I proposed the involvement of Romania in the post-Soviet space, while the actions of the Romanian state were strictly oriented towards the European-Central dimension and that the Western Euro-Atlantic government and Bucharest was hostage to Russian economic investment, because Russian oligarchy entered the country, there is a paradigm shift in the sphere of decision-making.

As editor-in-chief of a publication funded by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I declared the option “Romania, lawyer of Moldova” in an unfavorable and anti-Romanian context. Today, this concept has become an imperative beyond governments and political ideologies.

Geopolitical and geo-economic projects and initiatives are those that boost and quantify the quality of a geopolitical or political actor. We live in a world of geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic strategies and projects, and the more we take various initiatives, the more opportunities and solutions we will find to make it a strong and strong state.

Undoubtedly, Intermarium is now an opportunity and Romania must be involved in most projects where it identifies itself as a potential player and a partner capable of building European and Euro-Atlantic areas of well-being and security.

There are projects that would complement and give ground to the “Three Seas Initiative”. These initiatives are complemented and inferred from the capabilities of the United States, the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. In the latter case, the actions of European states on the east-European flank must be derived from the Global Strategy for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

How will NATO’s flagship consolidation be articulated and how will the economic and energy themes, the North-South relations, the challenges of European integration and the solidarity option of the European States be presented? assaulted or subject to external threats? He must understand Germany. Because today’s situation is a turning point that reminds us of the Reagan doctrine of 1987, which proposes a disconnection of Russian energy resources and an autonomous and non-dependent power with Russia. At that time, France and Germany considered that Russia should open up in Europe and become dependent on Russian energy resources. Today, we come to an updated distinction from former US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, who divides the old continent between “new” and “old” Europe. And this time, Eastern Europe is the one that shows a particular interest for America in Europe, rather than an old Western Europe, especially Germany, considered greedy and mercantile.

Compared to the old Intermarium, the Three Seas Initiative (Black Sea, Baltic and Adriatic) refers to regional cooperation, especially in the field of transport and energy, between Central and Eastern European countries[4].

The Black Sea region is a geostrategic space in which the adversities and interdependencies between Europe and Russia are concentrated, where we can speak of a latent conflict between East and West, where the Euro-Atlantic vision region, but there is one that belongs to Russia. After the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea becomes very important to shape the identity of a region. It should be noted that the Romanian state continues to be considered as the “pivotal state” of the export of democratic rights to the Eastern European space.

 

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30. PODVIG Pavel, “New Version of the Military Doctrine,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (blog), December 26, 2014, http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/new_version_of_the_military_do.shtml.
31. DELANOË Igor, “After the Crimean Crisis: Towards a Greater Russian Maritime Power in the Black Sea,” 369, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2014.944386, 379.
32. DELANOË Igor, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Persisting Security Challenge to the Black Sea Region,” Neighborhood Policy Paper, no.16 (July 2015): 11, http://www.khas.edu.tr/cies/75.
33. BLANK Stephen, “The Black Sea and Beyond,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine 14, no. 10 (October, 2015), http://usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-10.
34. LLYMENKO Andrii, “The Militarization of Crimea under Russian Occupation,” October 2015, Atlantic Council, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, p.2, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/The_Militarization_of_Crimea_under_Russian_Occupation.pdf.
35. Securitate şi stabilitate în bazinul Mării Negre: a V-a Sesiune Internaţională de Comunicări Ştiinţifice: Bucureşti, 21-22 noiembrie 2005 / Universitatea Naţională de Apărare (Bucureşti). Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare şi Securitate. – Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I”, 2005.
36. Hotărârea nr. 271/2013 pentru aprobarea Strategiei de securitate cibernetică a României şi a Planului de acţiune la nivel naţional privind implementarea Sistemului naţional de securitate cibernetică. Published in Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, no. 296 din 23.05.2013.
37. ЯШИН Илья, «Гибридная агрессия Кремля», Независимый аналитический обзор, декабрь 2016 г., город Москва.
38. HOEHN Andrew R., SOLOMON Richard H., EFRON Sonni, CAMM Frank, CHANDRA Anita, KNOPMAN Debra, LAIRD Burgess, LEMPERT Robert J., SHATZ Howard J., YOST Casimir, Strategic Choices for a Turbulent World: In Pursuit of Security and Opportunity, STRATEGIC RETHINK, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif, 2017.
39. Ministerul Afacerilor Externe al României, www.mae.ro.
40. Comisia Europeană: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm.
41. TRACECA : Transport Corridor Europe-Caucase-Asie ; CAREC : Central

Asia Regional Economic Cooperation.

42. KRAMER Franklin D., BINNENDIJK Hans, HAMILTON Daniel S., NATO’S NEW STRATEGY:STABILITY GENERATION, Atlantic Council, September 2015.

 

 

Articolul a fost publicat mai intii in volumul  “Trilaterala Romania-Ucraina-Moldova – Diplomatie si buna guvernare”, aparut la editura Top Form, in anul 2017.

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Octavian Sergentu, Magii extraterestre și starea de veghe pentru R. Moldova, Glasul Națiunii, no. 35(597), 23 februarie 2004.

[2] Ibidem.

[3] Octavian Sergentu, Fenomenul Băsescu pentru R. Moldova, Glasul Națiunii, no.18(628), 26 mai 2005.

[4] Octavian Sergentu, Fenomenul Băsescu pentru R. Moldova, Glasul Națiunii, no.18(628), 26 mai 2005.

[5] Ibidem.

[6] Octavian Sergentu, Vrăjitorii și doftorii pentru Europa de Est, Glasul Națiunii, no. 31(641), 8 septembrie 2005.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] Ministerul Afacerilor Externe al României, www.mae.ro.

[1] Octavian Sergentu, Redefinirea geopoliticii. Noi şi dimensiunea europeană, cotidianul FLUX, Chișinău, 2 aprilie, 2007.

[2] Octavian Sergentu, R. Moldova – lecţia reintegrării. Laboratorul experimentului rusesc, 24 aprilie, anul 2007, RGNpress.ro.

[3] Janusz Bugajski and Peter Doran, BLACK SEA RISING: Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe, Black Sea Strategic Report No.1, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), February 2016, p. 5.

[4] Idem., p. 16.

[5] Alocuţiunea Președintelui României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, și transcrierea dezbaterii „20 Years After – The Relevance of the Romanian – U.S. Strategic Partnership in the Current International and Security Context”, organizate de Heritage Foundation, 07 iunie 2017,| Statele Unite ale Americii, http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/discursuri/alocutiunea-presedintelui-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis-sustinuta-in-cadrul-dezbaterii-20-years-after-the-relevance-of-the-romanian-u-s-strategic-partnership-in-the-current-international-and-security-context-organizate-de-heritage-foundation.

[1] Introduced in House (07/24/2017), Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, https://congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364/ (Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, The President must submit for congressional review certain proposed actions to terminate or waive sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation. Specified executive order sanctions against Russia shall remain in effect. The President may waive specified cyber- and Ukraine-related sanctions. The bill provides sanctions for activities concerning: (1) cyber security, (2) crude oil projects, (3) financial institutions, (4) corruption, (5) human rights abuses, (6) evasion of sanctions, (7) transactions with Russian defense or intelligence sectors, (8) export pipelines, (9) privatization of state-owned assets by government officials, and (10) arms transfers to Syria.The Department of State shall work with the government of Ukraine to increase Ukraine’s energy security); (https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/blog/week-review-hostile-regimes-terrorist-threats/).

[2] А. А. Куртов, главный редактор, Предисловие, Румыния: истоки и современное состояние внешнеполитиче- ского позиционирования государства; кол. авт.: Е. С. Хотькова (рук.), С. М. Ермаков, В. Б. Каширин, О. Е. Лушников, Д. А. Мальцев, С. А. Михайлов ; Рос. ин-т стратег. исслед. – М. : РИСИ, 2013.

[3] Octavian Sergentu, Marea Neagră – între exportul democrației și ”lacul rusesc”, 26 martie 2008, www.presa.md.

[4] Lelia MUNTEANU, Liderii UE, alarmaţi de interesul lui Trump pentru Iniţiativa celor Trei Mări, iulie 2017, http://www.gandul.info/puterea-gandului/liderii-ue-alarmati-de-interesul-lui-trump-pentru-initiativa-celor-trei-mari-16564352.